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Jimmy Carter would say
later, "No matter who was with me, we watched the big grandfather
clock by the door." Time was running out, for it was Tuesday,
January 20, 1981. The scene was the Oval Office. In just hours this
president would leave it for good, and a new leader, Ronald Reagan,
would move in. As the clock ticked the time away, Carter tried to
resolve a crisis that had almost destroyed his presidency. He was
close, very close, and as he said, "At stake were the lives
of 52 precious human beings who had been imprisoned in Iran for
444 days–and almost 12 billion dollars of Iranian assets."
1
Prelude
President Carter announces sanctions against Iran
in the White
House Press Room
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The beginnings of this
crisis preceded Jimmy Carter’s term by almost thirty years.
For that long, the United States had provided political support
and, more recently, massive military assistance to the government
of the shah of Iran. Iran was important because it provided oil
to the industrial West and separated the Soviet Union from the Persian
Gulf and the oil states. The United States had an enormous stake
in keeping it stable and independent. By 1979, however, when Carter
had been in office three years, the shah was in trouble, reaping
the harvest of years of brutal and unpopular policies, including
the use of secret police that controlled dissent with arbitrary
arrests and torture.2 It was clear that the shah had lost the support
of his people, but the president hoped a coalition of the moderate
opponents might be formed. The stability of the country, though,
was being threatened by a religious fanatic, the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, who did not like the shah’s efforts to modernize
and Westernize a fiercely religious, fundamentalist society. In
January 1979, the shah fled into exile, and the theocratic regime
of Khomeini took power.
There was little informed
understanding in the U.S. government about the political implications
of this fundamentalist regime. Gary Sick, who was on the National
Security staff, recalled a meeting in which Vice President
Walter Mondale asked the Central Intelligence Agency director
Stansfield Turner, "What the hell is an ‘Ayatollah’
anyway." Turner said he wasn’t sure he knew.3 In the
beginning, the Carter administration made some effort to establish
a relationship with the new government, but by late 1979 it seemed
futile. Up until this crisis, few Americans seemed aware of the
deep resentments that many Iranian people continued to harbor
toward the United States, a country they considered a symbol of
Western intrusion into their society.4 Part of the problem stemmed
from the desire of the shah, in October 1979, to come to New York
City for cancer treatment. Many Iranians remembered a time in
1953 when the prime minister of Iran had challenged the authority
of the shah, who in turn, fled the country. However, with the
help of a CIA-supported coup, the monarch’s power was restored.5
Now Carter understood that if he allowed the deposed shah to come
to the United States., Khomeini’s government would interpret
the move as another example of the West’s arrogant interference
in Iran’s affairs. Though Carter understood it was a politically
volatile decision, he permitted the shah to come, based on a long
alliance and "humanitarian principle." American diplomats
in Iran met with the prime minister of the Ayatollah’s government
to test reaction to the president’s decision. Though deeply
opposed to this U.S. move, the prime minister gave assurances
that the Iranian government would protect the safety of diplomatic
personnel in Tehran.
Days later, on November 4, a mob of 3,000 militants invaded the
American embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six diplomats and military
personnel as hostages. The more moderate Iranian prime minister
resigned in protest, and Khomeini was in full control. The militants
demanded a return of the shah in exchange for the hostages. In
the meantime, despite the fact that the Carter administration
had arranged for the shah to leave the United States for Panama,
the crisis continued unabated. In April 1980, after months of
negotiations failed to result in the release of the hostages,
the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Iran. Carter
approved a hostage rescue mission by an elite paramilitary unit,
the American commandos led by Colonel Charles Beckwith.6 It was
a dismal failure. Several military helicopters broke down in the
desert, and eight commandos died when two aircraft collided during
the hasty retreat. The abortive mission seemed to many Americans
a symbol of U.S. military weakness in the post-Vietnam era. Carter’s
popularity plunged to 20 percent, even lower than Nixon’s
during the Watergate scandal.7
The Iranian hostage crisis contributed greatly to Jimmy Carter’s
loss of the presidency in the 1980 election. Americans had lost
confidence in their leader. It wasn’t difficult. Each night
television newscasts relayed images of angry anti-American mobs
outside the embassy in Tehran, shouting "Death to America,"
"Death to Carter."8 The creation of the television program,
Nightline, devoted strictly to discussion of the crisis,
was a blatant reminder of Carter’s failure to secure the
hostages’ release. Each night TV news commentators posted
the number of days the hostages had been held in humiliating,
terrifying captivity, their president impotent in finding a way
to bring them home. "This is the 325th day of
the Iranian hostage crisis," the journalists would say, and
on and on it went. Election day was the anniversary of the seizure,
an irony that wasn’t lost on the American people, who voted
for Ronald Reagan by large margins.
Now the clock
was ticking inexorably toward the last moment of Carter’s
time in office. He would later say that in those last weeks, the
return of the hostages was almost an obsession with him. In his
memoir, Keeping Faith, he explained:
Of course, their lives,
safety, and freedom were the paramount considerations, but there
was more to it. I wanted to have my decisions vindicated. It was
very likely that I had been defeated and would soon leave office
as President because I had kept these hostages and their fate
at the forefront of the world’s attention, and had clung
to a cautious and prudent policy in order to protect their lives
during the preceding fourteen months. Before God and my fellow
citizens, I wanted to exert every ounce of my strength and ability
during these last few days to achieve their liberation.9
It seemed within
reach. After months of negotiations the United States had agreed
to release several billion dollars in Iranian gold and bank assets,
frozen in American banks just after the seizure of the embassy.
The government of Iran, now involved in a war with neighboring
Iraq, was desperate for money and therefore seemed willing to
release the hostages.10 The Iranians refused to communicate directly
with the president, or any other American, so Algeria had agreed
to act as an intermediary. This arrangement slowed down the negotiating
process. As Carter recalled, "The Iranians, who spoke Persian,
would talk only with the Algerians, who spoke French. Any question
or proposal of mine had to be translated twice as it went from
Washington to Algiers to Tehran, and then the answers and counterproposals
had to come back to me over the same slow route."11 Much
of the money involved was being held in overseas branches of twelve
American banks, so Carter, his cabinet, and staff were constantly
on the phone to London, Istanbul, Bonn, and other world capitals
to work out the financial details.
Time
Crunch
President Carter in the Oval Office during the hostage crisis
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Jimmy Carter had come
back to the Oval Office from a "working weekend" at
Camp David that Sunday, January 18. Except for a few breaks, he
remained in that office until fifteen minutes before the Reagans
arrived to begin the inaugural ceremonies. Every force within
the government that Carter controlled was poised to accomplish
the mission, and now it seemed possible. Carter had already talked
to personnel at the U. S. military hospital in Wiesbaden, West
Germany, where the hostages would stay for a few days before "re-entry"
into the United States. The president hoped to greet them there
before his term was out.
Then came a
series of small, nerve-racking crises that slowed down the process.
At one time that last Sunday, Lloyd Cutler, one of the White House
attorneys, told the president there was a delay in the transfer
of assets–the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did not have
its part of the money! Fortunately, funds were shifted among the
reserve banks and the problem was solved. Another difficulty concerned
the time difference between Washington and Tehran. Because of
the war with Iraq, the Iranian officials had blackouts of airport
lights. This meant that once it got dark in Iran (about 9:30 a.m.
Washington time), even if the deal had been sealed, the Algerian
pilots would not take off until dawn. Thus, if the departure time
passed, everyone understood that it would be another eight to
ten hours before anything could happen. Work continued through
a long night. About 2:00 a.m., the president ordered blankets
from the White House steward, and he and Cutler each stretched
out on a couch to rest while they waited for news from the negotiations.12
Sometime in the early morning, word came that the planes were
on the runway in Tehran, and the hostages had been taken to the
vicinity of the airport. The Algerians had even agreed to depart
after dark if it was absolutely necessary. Finally, the phone
call came through. "We have a deal," Jimmy Carter said,
beaming. Someone popped a bottle of champagne. At 4:44 a.m. Carter
went to the press briefing room to announce that with the help
of Algeria the United States and Iran had reached an agreement.13
Certain "implementation" steps in the agreement needed
to be settled, and the hostages would be free.
Then
came another delay. The Algerian negotiator sent word that the
Iranian bank officials did not agree with the terms of accountability
in the banking agreements. They wouldn’t cooperate. The planes
were returned to their standby position. Hours passed, and still
no word came that the problem had been resolved. A Carter aide
had calculated that the president would have to leave Washington
no later than 2:00 p.m. Monday afternoon if he wanted to see the
hostages in Wiesbaden and be back in time for the inauguration.
Hamilton Jordan, White House chief of staff, asked the president
if he had to go to the inauguration. Carter reminded Jordan
that the inauguration was a symbol of the continuity of the government.
Yes, despite the importance of the negotiations, he did need to
attend! The staff soon understood that Carter’s trip to Germany
to greet hostages would not occur until after the inauguration.
The president switched from worrying about seeing the hostages
before the end of the term, to worrying that the entire negotiation
process could disintegrate. Carter talked with Deputy Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, who was in communication with the
Algerian foreign minister. He told Christopher to warn the Algerians
that the Carter presidency would end the next day at noon. "After
that," he said, "neither Christopher nor I could speak
for the United States, and the entire negotiating process might
have to begin anew."14
Jimmy and Rosalyn Carter celebrate the news that the hostages
will be released
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In the wee hours of
Tuesday, January 20, came some promising news. The processes required
to move the money through the proper channels were almost completed.
Only a few small details were to be ironed out. At 6:35 a.m.,
Christopher sent a message: "All escrows were signed at 6:18.
The Bank of England has certified that they hold $7.977 billion,
the correct amount." Now the bank would send word to Algiers
by telex or phone, which would notify Iran. At 7:45 a.m., with
messages still coming in fast and furious, Rosalyn Carter brought
her husband a razor, telling him, "You need a shave."
The barber was with her, to give Carter’s hair a trim before
the inaugural ceremonies. Rosalyn remembered that as she was leaving
the Oval Office to go back upstairs, Jimmy answered one more call,
and then yelled out for everyone to hear: "Flight 133 is
loaded and ready for take-off." Once more, there came elation,
cheers, and hugs. At 8:04 a.m., Algeria confirmed that the bank
certification was complete, and the Algerians were notifying Iran.
That was it! Every step was complete. Per the agreement, Iran
would move to "immediately bring about the safe departure
of the 52 nationals detained in Iran."15
Still Carter lingered in the Oval Office. Word had not yet come
that the hostages had left the ground in Tehran. At 9:45 a.m.,
Christopher called one last time and told Carter takeoff would
be by noon, but, as a security measure, the Iranian officials
did not want the word released until the hostages were out of
Iranian airspace. President Carter said the United States would
comply. Then Rosalyn came to the door, and said, "Jimmy,
the Reagans will be here in fifteen minutes. You will have to
put on your morning clothes and greet them."16
After the inauguration, a Secret Service agent pushed through
the crowd at the U.S. Capitol to tell former president Jimmy Carter
that at 12:33 p.m. the first plane carrying the hostages had taken
off from Tehran, and the second one had left nine minutes later.
President Ronald Reagan got the word at an inaugural luncheon.
It was the first official announcement he would make to the American
people. The hostages, on the 444th day of their captivity,
were set free. The republic rejoiced!
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