HARTFORD CONVENTION (Excerpts)

1815

Background:

Representatives of the New England States, unhappy with the progress of the War with England (War of 1812), and resentful over the balance of political power that seemed to give the South effective power of the national government, called a convention in Hartford, Connecticut in the fall of 1814. Though some of the representatives wanted secession, the convention settled for a statement of harsh criticism against the Madison administration, and a proposal for constitutional amendments that would protect their interests. Agreed to on January 4,1815, they were never presented to the government. As the convention emissaries approached the capital city, word came of Andrew Jackson’s victory over the British at New Orleans. The war was effectively over, and the complaints of the Hartford Convention paled in an atmosphere of victory.

Conditions under which one part of the country can separate from the rest:

If the Union be destined to dissolution by reason of multiplied abuses of bad administrations, it should, if possible, be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent. Some new form of confederacy should be substituted among those states which shall intend to maintain a federal relation to each other. Events may prove that the causes of our calamities are deep and permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from the blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party spirit, or the confusion of the times but they may be traced to implacable combinations of individuals, or of states, to monopolize power and office, and to trample without remorse upon the rights and interests of commercial sections of the Union. Whenever it shall appear that these causes are radical and permanent, a separation, by equitable arrangement, will be preferable to an alliance by constraint, among nominal friends, but real enemies, inflamed by mutual hatred, and jealousy, and, inviting, by intestine divisions contempt and aggression from abroad.

Complaints against the Madison administration:

…But no sooner was a new administration established in the hands of the party opposed to the Washington policy than a fixed determination was perceived and avowed of changing a system which had already produced these substantial fruits…

…The richest advantages for securing the great objects of the Constitution have been wantonly rejected. While Europe reprises from the convulsions which had shaken down her ancient institutions, she beholds with amazement this remote country, once so happy and so envied, involved in a ruinous war and excluded from intercourse with the rest of the world.

To investigate and explain the means by which this fatal reverse has been effected would require a voluminous discussion. Nothing more can be attempted in this report than a general allusion to the principle outlines of the policy which has produced this vicissitude. Among these may be enumerated:

First, a deliberate and extensive system for effecting a combination among certain states, by exciting local jealousies and ambition, so as to secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union the control of public affairs in perpetual succession; to which primary object most other characteristics of the system may be reconciled.

Second, the political intolerance displayed and avowed in excluding from office men of unexceptable merit for want of adherence to the executive creed.

Third, the infraction of the judiciary authority and rights by depriving judges of their offices in violation of the Constitution.

Fourth, the abolition of existing taxes, requisite to prepare the country for those changes to which nations are always exposed, with a view to the acquisition of popular favor.

Fifth, the influence of patronage in the distribution of offices, which in these states has been almost invariably made among men the least entitled to such distinction, and who have sold themselves as ready instruments for distracting public opinion, and encouraging administration to hold in contempt the wishes and remonstrances of a people thus apparently divided.

Sixth, the admission of two new states into the Union, formed at pleasure in the Western region, has destroyed the balance of power which existed among the original states and deeply affected their interest.

Seventh, the easy admission of naturalized foreigners to places of trust, honor, or profit, operating as an inducement to the malcontent subjects of the Old World to come to these states in quest of executive patronage, and repay it by an abject devotion to executive measures.

Eighth, hostility to Great Britain and particularly to the late government of France, adopted as a coincident with popular prejudice and subservient to the main object, party power. Connected with these must be ranked erroneous and distorted estimates of the power and resources of those nations, of the probable results of their controversies, and of our political relations to them respectively.

Last and principally, a visionary and superficial theory in regard to commerce, accompanied by a real hatred but feigned regard to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance in efforts to render it an instrument of coercion and war…

The Proposed Solution, including Constitutional Amendments:

Therefore resolved: that it be and hereby is recommended to the legislatures of the several states represented in this Convention, to adopt all such measures as may be necessary, effectually, to protect the citizens of said states from the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States, which shall contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not authorized by the constitution of the United States.

Resolved: that it be and hereby is recommended to the said Legislatures, to authorize an immediate and earnest application to be made to the government of the United States, requesting their consent to some arrangement, whereby the said states may, separately or in concert, be empowered to assume upon themselves the defense of their territory against the enemy; and a reasonable portion of the taxes, collected within said states, may be paid into the respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the payment of the balance due said states, and to the future defense of the same. The amount so paid into the said treasuries to be credited, and the disbursements made as aforesaid to be charged to the United States.

Resolved: that it be, and hereby is, recommended to the legislatures of the aforesaid states, to pass laws (where it has not already been done) authorizing the governors or commanders-in-chief of their militia to make detachments from the same, or to form voluntary corps, as shall be most convenient and conformable to their constitutions, and to cause the same to be well armed, equipped and disciplined, and held in readiness for service; and upon the request of the governor of either of the other states to employ the whole of such detachment or corps, as well as the regular forces of the state, or such part thereof as may be required and can be spared consistently with the safety of the state, in assisting the state, making such request to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made or attempted by the public enemy.

Resolved: that the following amendments of the constitution of the United States be recommended to the states represented as aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the state legislatures, and in such cases as may be deemed expedient by a convention chosen by the people of each state. And it is further recommended that the said states shall persevere in their efforts to obtain such amendments until the same shall be effected.

First, representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons.

Second, no new state shall be admitted into the Union by Congress, in virtue of the power granted by the constitution, without he concurrence of two thirds of both houses.

Third, Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States, in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days.

Fourth, Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation or the dependencies thereof.

Fifth, Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concurrence of two thirds of both houses, except such acts of hostility be in defense of the territories of the United States when actually invaded.

Sixth, no person who shall hereafter be naturalized, shall be eligible as a member of the senate or house of representatives of he United States, nor capable of holding any civil office under the authority of the United States.

Seventh, the same person shall not be elected president of the United States a second time; nor shall the President be elected from the same state two terms in succession.

Resolved, that if the application of these states to the government of the United States, recommended in a foregoing resolution, should be unsuccessful and peace should not be concluded, and the defense of these states should be neglected, as it has been since the commencement of the war, it will, in the opinion of this convention, be expedient for the legislatures of he several states to appoint delegates to another convention, to meet at Boston…with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require.